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Abstract
The act of cross-feeding whereby unrelated species exchange nutrients is a common feature of microbial interactions and
could be considered a form of reciprocal altruism or reciprocal cooperation. Past theoretical work suggests that the
evolution of cooperative cross-feeding in nature may be more challenging than for other types of cooperation. Here we re-
evaluate a mathematical model used previously to study persistence of cross-feeding and conclude that the maintenance of
cross-feeding interactions could be favoured for a larger parameter ranges than formerly observed. Strikingly, we also find
that large populations of cross-feeders are not necessarily vulnerable to extinction from an initially small number of cheats
who receive the benefit of cross-feeding but do not reciprocate in this cooperative interaction. This could explain the
widespread cooperative cross-feeding observed in natural populations.
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Introduction
Cross-feeding between unrelated species, termed syntrophy, is
the ability of one organism to use metabolites excreted by another
organism [1]. When this interaction involves a reciprocal
exchange between the partners as a cooperative behaviour and
not merely an exchange of waste products as a result of a selfish
act, cross-feeding can be considered a mutualistic act known as
reciprocal altruism [2] or reciprocal cooperation [3,4]. Such
behaviour is common in the microbial world [4–8] and is of a
fundamental importance to our understanding of microbial
communities and their impact on the environment. A remarkable
example can be found in the association between archaea and
bacteria that couple methane oxidation with sulfate reduction,
respectively. This syntrophic association has been estimated to
involve the consumption of more that 80% of the ocean methane
flux and is an important process needed to reduce the emissions
of the green house gas methane from the ocean into the
atmosphere [9–11]. Syntrophic interactions are also known to
play a key role in the degradation of xenobiotic compounds [12]
which is crucial for the minimization of surface and ground water
contamination by pesticides. Other examples of syntrophy
include interactions between fermentative bacteria and methan-
ogenic archeon [13]; methanogens and ethanol fermenters
[14,15] and between green-sulphur bacteria and the b-proteo-
bacteria [16].
While the importance of cross-feeding syntrophy is clear, what is
less clear is how can a group of individuals who engage in such
form of cooperative behaviour resist invasion by cheats who do not
pay the cost of cooperation but reap the reward? A model
exploring the conditions favouring the origin of cooperative cross-
feeding between two microbial species was recently proposed by
[17]. There the authors uncover some unintuitive constraints,
namely that the benefit of cooperative cross-feeding applies only in
the range of intermediate cell densities and is more easily selected
when the cost of cross-feeding to the donor is low per benefit to the
recipient and when the recipient already provides a large cross-
feeding benefit to the donor. This finding is contingent on the
existence of a trade-off between the cost to cooperators of
performing an altruistic act and the benefit to the recipients
towards whom the cooperation is directed. Such trade-off arises
naturally from the definition of a cooperative act because a cross-
feeding cooperative individual sacrifices its intrinsic growth to
benefit other species by facilitating their ability to grow. The
authors also find that large populations of cooperative cross-
feeders are vulnerable to exploiting genotypes (or cheats) who
share the cross-feeding resources but do not reciprocate in the
cross-feeding themselves.
In this paper we revisit the model presented in [17] and
highlight a number of parameter regimes that tend to increase the
window in which cooperation is favoured. Contrary to [17] we
find that large populations of cross-feeders are not easily taken
over and replaced by a small number of cheats. This result relies
on the assumption that all types have the same carrying capacity.
Subsequently we present an alternative evolutionary model that
relaxes the assumption of equal carrying capacities and again show
that replacement of cooperators by cheats is not the most common
outcome of evolution.
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Results
The mathematical model
In [17] the authors propose the following model of cross-
feeding. Consider a spatially heterogeneous environment contain-
ing two separate local patches. Each patch contains a pair of clonal
microbial populations interacting by cross-feeding in the following
way. Patch 1 contains genotypes X and Y engaged in a cross-
feeding syntrophy with X cross-feeding Y and Y cross-feeding X.
Patch 2 contains genotypes Xc and Y whereby Xc receives a cross-
feeding benefit from Y but does not reciprocate in the cross-
feeding. Population dynamics of each patch are subsequently
modeled as follows:
Patch 1 model
Let X(t) and Y(t) denote densities of genotypes X and Y
respectively, at time t. The rate of expansion of the X population is
governed by:
1. an intrinsic ability to grow denoted by rx;
2. the per capita level of cross-feeding described by byx
Y
Xzcx
where byx
represents a benefit to X per individual of type Y and cx
represents a damping constant that sets the cross-feeding
resource proportional to Y when X is vanishingly small;
3. crowding implemented through a total carrying capacity K of the
two microbial types.
Applying the same population expansion rules to type Y leads to
the following system of equations
dX
dt
~X (rxzbyx
Y
Xzcx
)(1{
XzY
K
),
dY
dt
~Y (ryzbxy
X
Yzcy
)(1{
XzY
K
),
ð1Þ
where ry denotes the growth constant for the population of type Y,
bxy represents a benefit of cross-feeding to Y per individual of type
X with the assumption that bxy = byx. The parameter cy denotes a
damping constant that sets the cross-feeding resource proportional
to X when Y is vanishingly small.
Patch 2 model
Let Xc(t) denote the density of genotype Xc at time t. The model
(1) can be adapted to describe interactions between Xc and Y as
follows
dXc
dt
~Xc(rxczbyx
Y
Xczcxc
)(1{
XczY
K
)
dY
dt
~Yry(1{
XczY
K
)
ð2Þ
where rxc denotes the growth term of non cross-feeder Xc with
rywrxc while cxc denotes the cross-feeding damping constant
defined in a similar way as cx in the model (1).
Xc can be viewed as a non-cooperative (or cheating) genotype.
By definition a cooperative trait carries a cost to cooperator of
performing an altruistic act while providing a benefit to the
recipient towards whom the cooperation is directed. Just as in [17]
we assume the existence of a trade-off between rx and bxy (as well as
between ry and byx) which means that a cross-feeding individual of
a given type sacrifices its own growth to facilitate the growth of
another type. Therefore, comparing model (1) and (2) we note that
rxcwrx because Xc does not pay a cost of cooperation and that
bxcy~0 as Xc does not provide a cross-feeding benefit to Y and
hence there is no bidirectional cross-feeding (0~bxcyvbxy). This
forms a part of the cost/benefit trade-off and is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The dynamics of model (1)
The cross-feeding model (1) has the following steady states
X #,Y #ð Þ~ 0,0ð Þ and X #,Y #ð Þ~ X ,K{Xð Þ
where 0#X#K.
The eigenvalues of the linearised system (1) around the zero
state are l1 = rx/ry and l2=1 and since both l1.0 and l2.0 we
conclude that (0,0) is an unstable steady state.
Therefore a small population (X(0),Y(0)) = (e1,e2) with e1 and e2
denoting positive constants near zero, will initially grow away from
the zero steady state according to the following equation:
(X (t),Y (t))~(e1e
l1t,e2e
l2t), for small t: ð3Þ
Subsequently the solution of (2) will approach one of the infinitely
many steady states (X,K2X) situated on the line segment Y=K2X.
Which steady state it converges to cannot be determined with
classical linearization techniques and will depend on the initial
population sizes e1 and e2.
The dynamics of model (2)
Similarly the model (2) has the following steady states
Xc
#,Y #ð Þ~ 0,0ð Þ and Xc#,Y #ð Þ~ Xc,K{Xcð Þ
where 0#Xc#K.
The eigenvalues of the linearised model (2) around the zero
steady state are lc1~rxc=ry and l2 = 1 and since both l
c
1.0 and
l2.0 we conclude that (0,0) is an unstable steady state.
Therefore a small population (Xc(0),Y(0)) = (e1,e2) will initially
grow away from the zero steady state according to the following
equation
(Xc(t),Y (t))~(e1e
lc
1
t,e2e
l2t), for t small: ð4Þ
Subsequently the solution of (2) will approach one of the infinitely
many steady states (Xc,K2Xc) situated on the line segment
Y=K2Xc. As for model (1), which steady state it converges to
will depend on the initial population sizes e1 and e2.
Comparing the dynamics of models (1) and (2)
As in [17] the success of the non-cross feeding strategy is
examined by comparing the cross-feeding genotype to the non
cross-feeding genotype across the two patches. In other words
starting with the same initial population densities (X(0),Y(0)) =
(e1,e2) and (Xc(0),Y(0)) = (e1,e2) in patch 1 and patch 2 respectively,
the X(t) component of the solution of (1) representing densities of
the cross-feeding strategy X is compared with the Xc(t) component
of the solution of (2) representing the density of the non cross-
feeding strategy Xc.
From (3) and (4) it follows that
X (t)~e1e
l1tvXc(t)~e1el
c
1
t
for some small time t. Therefore as found in [17], at low
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population densities Xc always does better than X because rxcwrx
and thereforelc1wl1. This means that at low densities the cost of
cooperation is not compensated by the benefit of cross-feeding.
Whether there exist a time interval for which the cross-feeding
genotype does better than the non-cross feeding genotype
(X(t).Xc(t)) depends on a range of assumptions regarding the
nature of the trade-off between the cost of cooperation and the
benefit to the recipient, the initial population densities as well as
the values of the intrinsic growth rates and/or the benefit of cross-
feeding. For growth at intermediate densities the study presented
in [17] generates the following results:
N BH1: When byx.0, selection always favours reciprocal cross-
feeding from X to Y when rx#ry.
N BH2: Trade-offs with big gains in bxy per decline in rx enhance
evolution of cooperation.
N BH3: Large byx enhance the evolution of reciprocity in the
other direction from X to Y.
The above results have been generated by approximating non-
linear dynamics with a linear model. In this paper we revisit BH1-
BH3 for the non-linear models (1) and (2) assuming that each
model has the same initial population densities of both genotypes
(e1= e2). Our study shows that BH1 does not hold in general. As
illustrated in [17], we find that cross-feeding from X to Y is
favoured if the slope of the trade-off curve satisfies
rx{rxc
bxy
~
{0:1, in other words if the cost of cross-feeding is 10% of the
value of the benefit of cross-feeding, and if bxy is sufficiently large
(Figure 1A). In that case the cross-feeder X outgrows the non
cross-feeder Xc for some intermediate time between the initial
exponential growth and the final stationary phase (Figure 2A).
However we find that changing the slope of the trade-off function
has a profound effect on the above outcome. In particular we
consider the case where the slope of the trade-off function is
changing from shallow (20.1) to steep (21). Decreasing the slope
can be achieved either by lowering the benefit of cross-feeding (bxy)
or by increasing the cost of cooperation (rxc{rx) (see Figure 1A).
In both cases we find that the cross-feeders never outgrow the non
cross-feeders i.e X(t),Xc(t) all t.0 (Figure 2B,C). Note that in the
case where bxy has been decreased (Figure 2B) the parameter byx
was also altered so that bxy = byx. Also note that in the case where
the cost of cooperation has been increased (Figure 2C) the intrinsic
growth rate of the Y genotype, ry, is modified so that the
assumption rywrxcwrx is upheld.
Whether the cross-feeding is favoured at intermediate densities
is not solely determined by the slope of the trade-off function. For
example retaining the shallow slope of 20.1 but changing the
benefit of cooperation indicates that a small benefit (and therefore
a small cost) of cross-feeding is less likely to favour the cross-
feeding (Figure 1B). While this finding again contradicts BH1 it is
in agreement with the result BH3 given that we assume that
bxy = byx.
The result BH2 states that shallow trade-offs enhance the
evolution of cooperation. While our findings agree with BH2 our
results show that depending on the r and b parameter values, steep
trade-offs can also promote the evolution of cooperation. For
example the lower the values of rxc and rx (and by definition ry), the
steeper the angle of the trade-off for which the cross-feeding is
favoured at intermediate densities (Figure 1C). Keeping bxy fixed
Figure 1C illustrates that when rxc =0.009 and rx=0.008 the
cross-feeding is favoured for trade-off slopes satisfying (rxc{rx)
ƒ0:8bxy. However, when rxc =0.025 and rx=0.015 cross-feeding
is favoured for less steeper slopes (rxc{rx)ƒ0:5bxy. Note that
when rxc{rx§1:bxy the cross-feeding is never favoured.
Reducing the initial population densities for both models (1) and
(2) can lead to a dramatic change in the outcome from cross-
feeding being favoured at intermediate densities (Figure 3A) to
cross-feeders never outgrowing the non cross-feeders (Figure 3B).
Similar results have been observed in [17].
We also note that changing the slope of the trade-off
relationship has an impact on the final population densities. For
example comparing the outcomes of Figures 2A and 2B it can be
seen that decreasing the benefit of cross-feeding leads to lower final
population sizes of both X and Xc genotypes. This could be
explained in the following way. Decreasing the benefit of cross-
feeding lowers the impact of cross-feeding on population growth
and therefore growth of different genotypes is dominated by their
intrinsic ability to grow. Given that rywrxcwrx the Y genotype
dominates the dynamics of both model (1) and (2) resulting in a
smaller final population sizes of both X and Xc. Similarly, by
comparing the outcomes of Figure 2A and 2C it can be seen that
an increase in the cost of cooperation also results in lower final
population sizes of both X and Xc. In this case an increase in the
cost of cooperation was achieved by increasing ry{rx and ry{rxc
so that again the genotype Y dominated the dynamics of both
model (1) and (2) resulting in a smaller final population sizes of
both X and Xc.
Evolutionary dynamics
Competition between cheats and cooperators. So far we
have been considering a scenario where pairs of interacting
microbial genotypes engaging in different levels of cross-feeding
grow in two isolated patches or colonies [17]. One could envisage
a situation where at some point the populations will become large
enough so that other types could migrate or could arise by
mutation. This immediately raises the following question. What
would happen to the equilibrium dynamics in patch (1) if a small
amount of a cheating genotype Xc is introduced either through
migration from patch 2 or through mutation in genotype X? To
answer this question model (1) can be adapted as in [17] to include
an equation for the cheating genotype Xc:
dX
dt
~X (rxzbyx
Y
XzXczcx
)(1{
XzXczY
K
)
dY
dt
~Y (ryzbxy
X
Yzcy
)(1{
XzXczY
K
)
dXc
dt
~Xc(rxczbyx
Y
XzXczcx
)(1{
XzXczY
K
)
ð5Þ
We are interested in the dynamics of (5) given the initial conditions
(X(0),Y(0),Xc(0)) = (X
*,Y*,e), where (X*,Y*) is a non-zero steady state
of model (1) and e is a small constant. Such initial conditions
denote the fact that a small population of non-cross feeding cheats
Figure 1. Trade-off between the cost of cooperation and the benefit to the recipient determines cross-feeding success. Whether
cross-feeding is favoured at intermediate densities depends on: A. the slope of the trade-off function with cross-feeding more easily selected for
shallow slopes; B. the values of the cost (rxc{rx) and the benefit (bxy) of cross-feeding with cross-feeding more easily selected for high rxc{rx and
bxy; C. the value of the intrinsic growth parameters (ry,rxc ,rx) with cross-feeding more easily selected for low ry,rxc and rx. Throughout the figure black
lines denote cases where cross-feeding is favoured while red lines denote cases where cross-feeding is not favoured.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014121.g001
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has been introduced into patch 1 after its resident population has
reached an ecological equilibrium.
Apart from the zero steady state the model (5) has infinitely
many steady states satisfying the equation X+Y+Xc =K. As with
models (1) and (2) the local stability of these steady states cannot be
determined from simple linearization techniques. Numerical
simulations indicate that for an initial condition (X*,Y*,e) the
model (5) will converge to a steady state (X*2d1,Y
*2d2,d1+d2)
where d1 and d2 are small constants (Figure 4). This means that
once established the cooperator genotype is not necessarily
vulnerable to exploitation by the cheating genotype. Instead the
cheat remains in the population but at low levels, close to the
initial value e.
A similar observation can be made for the case where a
small amount of cooperator genotype is introduced into
patch 2 whose resident genotypes have reached an ecological
equilibrium.
Evolution of cooperation. The competition model (5)
assumes that all interacting types have the same carrying
capacity, which in practice might not always be the case. In fact
a cross-feeding between unrelated species often involves organisms
that specialize on different resources. One such example is the
interactions between two mutant strains
Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica ser. Typhimurium described in
[18]. Both strains were grown in lactose but Salmonella is not able to
utilize lactose as an energy resource and instead uses a metabolite
(acetate) excreted by E.coli. On the other hand, E.coli can only
degrade lactose in the presence of the amino acid methionine,
which is synthesized by Salmonella but not by E.coli.
Motivated by [18] we alter the assumptions in (5) in order to
explore general conditions for the evolution of cooperative
cross-feeding. We begin by assuming that there is no
interspecific competition for resources between the two cross-
feeding types X and Y. This assumption is motivated by the fact
that E.coli and Salmonella enterica ser Typhimurium do not utilize the
same limiting nutrient as energy source and therefore do not
compete for the same resource. For simplicity we also assume
that the benefit of cross-feeding is simply proportional to the
density of the individuals of the type providing nutrients.
Therefore the cross-feeding interactions between X and Y can
Figure 2. Simulation of two-species population growth for the model (1) and model (2). In the case of model (1) type X and Y cross-feed
each other and in the case of model (2) Xc doesn’t cross-feed Y but Y cross-feeds Xc. Here we plot X(t) solution of (1) (full line) together with Xc(t)
solution of (2) (dashed line) with A. ry=0.011, rx=0.008, rxc =0.009, bxy= byx= 0.01; B. ry = 0.011, rx=0.008, rxc =0.009, bxy= byx= 0.001; C. ry= 0.03,
rx= 0.015, rxc = 0.025, bxy= byx=0.01. For both simulations of model (1) and (2) and in all three cases presented here K= 10000, cy~cx~cxc~1 and
e1= e2=0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014121.g002
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now be written as:
dX
dt
~X (rxzbyxY )(1{
bX
Kx
),
dY
dt
~Y (ryzbxyX )(1{
Y
Ky
):
ð6Þ
where b is the parameter describing the intraspecific competi-
tion amongst individuals of type X while Kx and Ky denote
carrying capacities of X and Y respectively. The above system
(6) has a trivial (0,0), two semi-trivial (Kx/b,0), (0, Ky) and the
non-trivial steady state (Kx/b,Ky). While the trivial and both
semi-trivial steady states are unstable, the non-trivial steady
state is stable (see Text S1).
We choose bxy, the benefit of cross-feeding to Y per individual X,
as the evolving trait belonging to a one-dimensional phenotypic trait
space [0, bxymax]. This phenotype can be viewed as an investment
made by X into cooperation so that individuals with bxy=0 do not
invest into cooperation while individuals with bxy= bxymax invest
maximally into cooperation. We assume that there will always be a
biologically feasible maximum to any investment.
We now consider the effect of adding a mutant type Xm with
phenotypic characteristic bxym to the system (6) that is at the non-
trivial steady state (Kx/b,Ky). The evolution of the benefit of cross-
feeding to Y per individual X (bxy) is governed by the following
three trade-offs:
1. The trade-off between investment into cooperation (bxy) and an
intrinsic ability to grow (rx) is denoted by rx= f(bxy), which is a
decreasing function of bxy.
2. We also assume an asymmetric competition between the
resident type X and a mutant type Xm, whereby increased
investment into cooperation results in an increased competitive
ability. This can in part be justified by the inevitable existence
of structure with a given environment. For example Salmonella
strains that produce large amount of methionine could have a
larger amount of acetate in their neighbourhood (created by
E.coli through cross-feeding) than the Salmonella types producing
less methionine. Therefore we define a function b(bxy2bxym)
Figure 3. Initial population densities influence whether the cross-feeding will be favoured. For both simulations of model (1) and (2)
ry= 0.11, rx=0.088, rxc = 0.09, bxy= byx=0.01, K=10000 and cy~cx~cxc~1. A. cross-feeding is favoured for initial conditions e1= e2=0.01; B. cross-
feeding is not favoured for initial conditions e1= e2= 0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014121.g003
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describing the effect of the mutant strategy bxym on the resident
strategy bxy which is a decreasing function of bxy2bxym.
3. Finally we assume the existence of a trade-off between the
investment into cooperation and the carrying capacity Kx,
where the carrying capacity is now a decreasing function of bxy,
denoted by K(bxy). This assumption is motivated by the known
inhibitory properties of methionine [19] so that an increased
investment into cooperation leads to the over production of
methionine which in turn leads to a reduction in the carrying
capacity of the cooperating producer.
The equations for the new (mutated) system are given by:
dX
dt
~X (f (bxy)zbyxY )(1{
b(0)Xzb(bxy{bxym)Xm
K(bxy)
),
dY
dt
~Y (ryzbxyXzbxymXm)(1{
Y
Ky
),
dXm
dt
~Xm(f (bxym)zbyxY )(1{
b(0)Xmzb(bxym{bxy)X
K(bxym)
):
ð7Þ
The fitness of the invading mutant Xm is the largest eigenvalue of
the system (7) at the steady state (Kx/b,Ky,0) (see [20]), and is
denoted by lbxy (bxym) which takes the following form
lbxy (bxym)~(f (bxym)zbyxKy)(1{
b(bxym{bxy)K(bxy)
K(bxym)b(0)
):
For a discussion of the notion of fitness see [21]. The invader’s
success will depend on its fitness in the following way: an invader
with phenotypic characteristic bxym when initially rare will be able
to invade the resident population with phenotypic characteristic bxy
if lbxy (bxym).0. Alternatively, if lbxy (bxym),0, the invading
population will die out. A phenotypic value for which the local
fitness gradient is zero is called an ‘evolutionarily singular strategy’
[21], in our case denoted by b*. According to [21] and [22], at a
singular strategy several evolutionary outcomes are possible. A
singular strategy can: lack convergence stability and therefore act
as an evolutionary repellor; be both evolutionarily and conver-
gence stable and therefore be the final outcome of the evolution
(also called ‘continuously stable strategy’); and, finally, be
convergence stable but not evolutionarily stable, in which case it
is called a ‘branching point’. These classifications are based on the
assumption that, away from a singular strategy, the principle of
mutual exclusion holds so that, after a successful invasion, the
Figure 4. Evolutionary dynamics where mutants do not invade. A. Numerical simulations of the model (1) with ry= 0.011, rx= 0.008,
bxy= byx=0.01, K=10000 and cy~cx~cxc~1. The figure shows an initial population X(0) = Y(0) = 0.01 converging to a steady state (X
*,Y*).
B. Numerical simulations of the model (5) where a small amount of non-cross feeder (Xc(0) = 0.01), is introduced into the steady state population
(X*,Y*). The figure shows that the cross-feeder X is not vulnerable to invasion by non-cross feeder Xc. In addition to the above parameters rxc =0.009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014121.g004
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nearby invading population takes over and replaces the resident
population. However, in a small neighbourhood of a singular
strategy, the successful invasion by a nearby mutant can, under
certain conditions, result in the coexistence of the invader and of
the resident type populations [22].
Here the outcome of the evolution of cooperation is investigated
in a manner similar to the one described in [23]. The results are
summarized in the Table 1 and detailed calculations are presented
in Text S2.
Under what conditions the cheating type Xm that does not
invest into cooperation and hence have bxym=0, outcompetes the
resident type X that has a non-zero investment into cooperation
namely bxy.0? From Table 1 it follows that this is only possible
when K is a convex function near the singular strategy b*(see
Figure 5A left for an example). In that case the singular strategy
could be a repellor which means that if the benefit to Y of the
resident population X, bxy, is less than b
*, the system will evolve
towards the population where there is no benefit to Y from X. On
the other hand if bxy.b
*, the system will evolve towards the
population where Y receives a maximal possible benefit from X
(Figure 5A right).
In all of the remaining cases the following outcomes are
possible. The singular strategy b* is a continuously stable strategy
(CSS) which implies that an initially monomorphic population of
type X with the trait bxy remains monomorphic throughout the
course of evolution with a non-zero investment into cooperation,
b*, representing the final outcome of evolution. Alternatively
b*could be a branching point whereby an initially monomorphic
population becomes dimorphic in the vicinity of b*. In this case the
outcome of evolution is a population containing two or more
phenotypes with varying degree of investment into cooperation.
Table 1 shows that convex K does not always imply that the
singular strategy b* is a repellor. Under certain conditions (see
Text S2) it can also be a branching point (Figure 5B) or a CSS.
Therefore the instances where a cheat phenotype with bxy=0
outcompetes and replaces a cooperating phenotype with bxy.0
could be viewed as relatively rare.
However, given that the carrying capacity trade-off is motivated
by the inhibitory properties of methionine [19] we argue that a
concave K illustrated in Figure 5C left would be more appropriate
as there is a threshold concentration of methionine above which
the carrying capacity decreases. In this case the singular strategy is
never a repellor and therefore cheats never outcompete and
replace cross-feeding cooperators (Figure 5C right).
In this section we have classified a variety of evolutionary
outcomes with respect to persistence of cooperation that depend
on the shape of the K and ßb trade-offs. While there are many
experimental evolutionary studies on microbial cooperation that
have acknowledged the existence of different outcomes when a
cooperative population is invaded by a mutant with a different
investment into cooperation [24–29] very little is still known about
the conditions that favour the evolution of cooperative cross-
feeding between species. Pioneering work on the experimental
evolution of novel cooperation between two cross-feeding species,
[18], has been an important step towards a better understanding of
the factors that enable interspecific cooperation in a cross-feeding
interaction. But as highlighted by the author in [18] there is still ‘‘a
lack of clear explanation of the mechanisms necessary for the
evolutionary origin of cooperation, particularly between species’’.
Further experimental studies are needed to shed light on this
important problem.
Discussion
When the cost of cross-feeding to the donor (rxc{rx) is greater
or equal to the benefit to the recipient (bxy) cooperation is never
favoured. Indeed, by definition a reciprocal interaction provides a
direct fitness benefit to the cooperators and this suggests that a
cooperative trait will only be selected if the benefit to cooperate is
higher than its cost. Additionally, this also reflects the fact that an
individual that doesn’t pay the cost of cooperation in the short
term will not gain the benefit of cooperation in the long term [4].
Previous theoretical results indicate that the cross-feeding is
more easily selected when its cost to the donor is low per benefit to
the recipient, in other words (rxc{rx)=bxy is sufficiently small
[30,31] and when the recipient already provides a large cross-
feeding benefit to the donor, in other words when bxy is sufficiently
large [17]. Our study recovers the same outcomes (Figure 1A,B)
but in addition we obtain results that are at odds with those
presented in [17] in the case of growth at intermediate densities.
Before summarising the differences in outcomes we note that they
come about due to the fact that while we study the non-linear
system (1) the results in [17] are obtained using a linear
approximation of (1). Contrary to [17], we find that the cross-
feeder does not always outgrow the non cross-feeder when the
benefit of cross-feeding to X per individual of type Y is byx.0 and
rx#ry (Figure 2B,C). In addition to [17] we find that steep trade-
offs can also promote the evolution of cross-feeding (Figure 1C).
Namely, a decrease in the intrinsic growth rates increases the
range of values of (rxc{rx)=bxy for which the cross-feeding is
favoured. This is explained by the fact that when intrinsic growth
rates are low compared to the benefit of cross-feeding, the cross-
feeding term dominates the overall growth of microorganisms and
therefore the cost of cross-feeding is not required to be too low for
the cross-feeding to be favoured. Surprisingly, our model indicates
that in some cases cross-feeding is favoured even if the cost to the
donor is up to 80% of the value of the benefit to the recipient. This
seems to suggest the following. Firstly, if populations have high
intrinsic growth rate and are therefore less dependent on the cross-
feeding interactions to grow, cross-feeding interactions are less
Table 1. Possible evolutionary singularities (b*) with different functional forms of K and b.
b concave near 0
(b0(0),0)
b linear near 0
(b0(0) = 0)
b convex near 0
(b0(0).0)
K concave near b*
(K0(b*),0)
Branching point or CSS CSS CSS
K linear near b*
(K0(b*) = 0)
Branching point Degenerate CSS
K convex near b*
(K0(b*).0)
Branching point or repellor Branching point or repellor Branching point; repellor or CSS
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014121.t001
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favoured. Secondly, an increase in synergic benefit of cooperation
should result in cooperation being more easily selected for [32].
The advantage of cross-feeding is also known to change with
initial population densities of interacting microorganisms [17]. In
addition we find that a reduction in the initial population densities
can lead to a dramatic change in the outcome from cross-feeding
being favoured at intermediate densities to cross-feeders never
being able to outgrow non cross-feeders.
In evolutionary terms, our study reveals a result different to that
reported in [17]. We find that once a population of two cross-
feeders has been established in a spatially isolated colony, the large
populations of cross-feeders are not vulnerable to small numbers of
exploiting genotypes that arise through migration or mutation and
who share in the cross-feeding resources but do not reciprocate in
cross-feeding themselves. However, this result relies on the
assumption that all microbial types have the same carrying
capacity. Subsequently we considered a more general evolutionary
model assuming that X and Y utilize different resources and
therefore have different carrying capacities, [18]. Motivated by
[19] we also introduced the following additional trade-offs: an
increased investment into cooperation results in an increased
competitive ability but a decreased carrying capacity. We find that
an exploiting genotype that does not reciprocate in cross-feeding
can take over and replace the resident cooperator genotype only in
certain cases when the carrying capacity trade-off is convex. Given
that such trade-off is motivated by the inhibitory properties of
methionine [19] we argue that a concave trade-off illustrated in
Figure 5C would be more appropriate as there is a threshold
concentration of methionine above which the carrying capacity
decreases. Our results indicate that a concave trade-off between
investment into cooperation and carrying capacity is most likely to
give rise to populations containing a single phenotype that has a
non-zero investment into cooperation.
In conclusion our results have a number of important messages.
Firstly, the shape of the trade-off between the cost and benefit of
cooperation has a profound effect on the success of cross-feeders
(cooperators) in comparison to non cross-feeders (cheats). In other
words whether cross-feeding is favoured or not depends on
whether the cost to the donor decreases slower or faster than the
benefit to the recipient. This is in accordance with both classical
[33–35] and recent [36–40] theoretical work showing that the
precise form of the trade-off curves crucially determines the
outcome of evolution. Therefore in order to deepen our
understanding of the evolution of cooperative cross-feeding, it is
extremely important to obtain precise estimation of the shape of
the cost/benefit trade-off. Elucidating the shape of a trade-off
relationship in general is something that has so far proven to be
particularly challenging. However, due to their large population
sizes, short generation times and known genetic structure
microorganisms present an ideal system with which to experi-
mentally study the nature and form of trade-off relationships
[41,42].
Secondly, we have demonstrated that the impact of the trade-off
between the cost and the benefit of cross-feeding varies with
different environments. For example, in the environments where
the intrinsic growth rates of microbes under consideration are
higher than the benefit of cross-feeding, cooperative behaviour is
favoured only for sufficiently shallow trade-offs. However, in the
environments where the intrinsic growth rates are lower than the
benefit of cross-feeding, cooperation behaviour is favoured for a
large range of trade-off slopes.
Finally, when considering the evolution of cross-feeding we
found that if all interacting individuals have the same carrying
capacity a small population of cheats could not invade an already
established population of cooperating cross-feeders. If we assume
that cross-feeding species specialize on different resources and
hence have different carrying capacities the outcome of evolution
depends on the shape of the trade-off between investment into
cooperation and competitive ability and the trade-off between
investment into cooperation and carrying capacity. The most
common outcome of evolution is either polymorphism where the
evolving population contains two or more genotypes with varying
degree of cooperation or monomorphism where the evolving
population contains a single phenotype that makes a non-zero
investment into cooperation. This further demonstrates that cross-
feeding could be viewed as a robust interaction, a result that
accords with a large number of cross-feeding examples readily
observed in nature.
Materials and Methods
Numerical simulations were performed using MATLAB.
Parameter values for each illustration are provided in the figure
legends.
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